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Article
A core component of human psychological functioning is the 
construction of meaning and purpose in life, a process that is 
subject to self-perceptions and situational effects (Baggini, 
2004; Baumeister, 1991; Berger, 1967/1990; Park, 2010). 
However, for atheists and other nonreligious individuals, it is 
sometimes assumed that being without god(s) is the equiva-
lent of being bereft of meaning or purpose in life (cf. 
Blessing, 2013). This assumption is somewhat odd, given 
that Bering (2002, 2003) suggests humans are evolutionarily 
hardwired with an existential theory of mind, which is a gen-
eral cognitive mechanism compelling humans to find reli-
gious or philosophical meaning or purpose in life events 
(Coleman & Hood, 2015). Similarly, sociological approaches 
to meaning conceive it as a compulsion “. . . to impose a 
meaningful order upon reality,” all the while emphasizing 
the creation and sustainment of meaning as an inherently 
social, cultural, and discursive practice (Berger, 1967/1990, 
p. 22). In essence, the impetus to construct meaning or pur-
pose in life is a quintessential consequence of being human, 
rather than something wholly under the purview of a specific 
religious or philosophical framework.
In this vein, there is no shortage of views on what life 
meaning is, how it “works,” or how we should conceive of it. 
Frankl (1959/2006) argued that meaning in life was some-
thing that each individual seeks and constructs for them-
selves, whereas Baumeister (1991) argued that life meaning 
is comprised of four elements: a goal or purpose, values and 
justification for goals and purposes, a sense of control, and 
self-worth. Schnell (2009) identified twenty-six sources of 
meaning in life, ranging from aspects of community and 
togetherness, to nature, generativity, religion, and self-
knowledge. In a nuanced approach, Park (2010, 2013) has 
drawn a distinction between global meaning and situational 
meaning. Global meaning refers to abstract conceptual sys-
tems and schema such as “religious beliefs . . . fairness, con-
trol, coherence, benevolence of the world and other people” 
(Park, 2013, p. 361). Situational meaning refers to ascrip-
tions of meaning or purpose in specific encounters; the 
meaning or purpose a person ascribes to an event depends on 
her or his preconceptions and experiences.
Because meaning and purpose in life can be framed in 
numerous ways and are derived from multiple sources and 
circumstances, one could reasonably expect that some 
sources or paths substantially differ from others. Park and 
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Abstract
Nonreligion is often thought to be commensurate with nihilism or fatalism, resulting in the perception that the nonreligious have 
no source of meaning in life. While views to this effect have been advanced in various arenas, no empirical evaluation of such 
a view has been conducted. Using data from the 2008 American General Social Survey (N = ~1,200), we investigated whether 
atheists, the religiously unaffiliated, and persons raised religiously unaffiliated were more likely than theists, the religiously 
affiliated, and persons raised with a religious affiliation to report greater levels of fatalism, nihilism, and the perception that 
meaning in life is self-provided. Results suggested that these groups did not differ with regard to fatalism or nihilism. However, 
atheists and the religiously unaffiliated (but not persons raised in a religiously unaffiliated household) were more likely to 
indicate that meaning in life was endogenous—that is, self-produced. While atheists and the nonreligious differed from their 
counterparts on source of meaning in life, this was not associated with any “penalty” for overall existential meaning.
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McNamara (2006) note that religious systems provide pur-
pose or meaning to individuals. In fact, this is often seen as a 
primary function of religion. Other researchers have echoed 
these sentiments and explicitly recognized that religious sys-
tems provide strong and coherent sources for meaning in life, 
due to the fact that these systems appeal to an “ultimate” 
source (Crescioni & Baumeister, 2013; also see Vail et al., 
2010). Park and McNamara (2006) suggest that not only are 
“religious frameworks comprehensive, but they tend to be 
much more ‘existentially satisfactory’ than secular explana-
tions such as the cold, hard objectivity of science”1 (p. 67; 
also see Farias, Newheiser, Kahane, & de Toledo, 2013; 
Schumaker, 1992, on belief in science in the face of stress 
and existential anxiety).
Nonreligion and Meaning in Life
There are some major drawbacks of this aforementioned 
research. One is an inability to separate the functioning of 
purely secular psychological mechanisms from any specific 
religious/spiritual processes (Galen, 2017a, 2017b). This 
inability may be related to research suggesting that religious/
spiritual activities do not have intrinsic benefits, but rather 
benefits that are contingent on an individual’s valuation of 
those activities (Speed, 2017; Speed & Fowler, 2017). This 
accords with the simple view that “whatever makes life mean-
ingful is heavily loaded with whatever people value” (Klinger, 
2012, p. 29). In other words, some persons may find that with-
out a framework centered on the divine or transcendent, they 
are more likely to adopt a nihilistic or fatalistic perspective 
(i.e., a negation of [life] meaning; Crosby, 1988). However, 
the conclusion that god(s) or religious frameworks are neces-
sary for meaning is predicated on the idea that religion or 
spirituality intrinsically promote meaning for everyone, which 
can be read to imply that meaning cannot be internally derived 
or generated. The perception that an individual is forced to 
accept nihilism or fatalism in their worldview because they 
lack a religious or spiritual schema with which to interpret the 
world is unsupported by the existing literature (Caldwell-
Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & Beit-Hallahmi, 2011; Coleman 
& Arrowood, 2015; Langston, 2014). Furthermore, the logic 
of why religious or spiritual frameworks would promote 
meaning in life is highly selective. It could be argued that a 
person who surrenders to god(s)’ perceived will would accept 
that there is one path to follow or that there is no meaning 
other than serving god(s). Instead, most discussions surround-
ing this topic tend to assume as a default that relatively higher 
religion or spirituality, however measured, implies greater 
meaning (e.g., Crescioni & Baumeister, 2013; Pargament, 
1997; Park & McNamara, 2006).
The consequences of atheism or being religiously unaffili-
ated for meaning in life, and for psychological well-being more 
broadly, are unknown or at the very least not held to be static or 
linear. A cursory examination of the literature would show that 
atheists are characterized as having various psychological 
deficits (e.g., Barrett, 2012), and popular perceptions remain 
that they are likely to be more nihilistic or have viewpoints con-
sistent with fatalism (cf. Blessing, 2013). Other research sug-
gests that nonreligiosity “divest[s] people of certain age-old 
pathways to psychological health” (Schumaker, 1992, p. 65).
Additionally, research shows consistent links between 
meaning in life and psychological well-being (e.g., Krause & 
Pargament, 2017; Schnell, 2009; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992; 
for a review, see Steger, 2017), as well as meaning in life and 
religiousness or religiosity (e.g., Ivtzan, Chan, Gardner, & 
Prashar, 2013; Steger & Frazier, 2005; Tiliouine & Belgoumidi, 
2009). These findings align with Schumaker (1992), who 
found that accounting for the relationship between meaning in 
life and well-being substantially reduces the salutary effects of 
religiosity (Schumaker, 1992). In other words, some of the 
benefits associated with religiosity are due to its positive rela-
tionship with producing meaning in life.
However, other research has shown that the irreligious do 
not experience deficits in meaning in life (Caldwell-Harris 
et al., 2011; Wilkinson & Coleman, 2010), happiness (Speed, 
2017; Speed & Fowler, 2017), or well-being (Galen, 2015; 
Streib & Klein, 2013), and that the irreligious do not differ in 
terms of psychological well-being (Galen, 2015; Streib & 
Klein, 2013; although cf. Hayward, Krause, Ironson, Hill, & 
Emmons, 2016). Essentially, the literature is incongruous: 
irreligious persons are ostensibly disadvantaged for psycho-
logical well-being, but do not seem to report poorer psycho-
logical well-being.
This dissonance within the research is problematic for a 
number of reasons. More than 20% of the American popula-
tion identifies as nonreligious (Religious Landscape Study, 
2016), and some projections suggest this number could climb 
to almost half of the U.S. population by the year 2042 (see 
Stinespring & Cragun, 2015, who estimate between 26% and 
47%). Furthermore, in adolescents and young adults, we find 
a generational difference, which suggests children are sig-
nificantly less religious than their parents (Thiessen & 
Wilkins-Laflamme, 2017; Twenge, Exline, Grubbs, Sastry, 
& Campbell, 2015), and have relationships with religion 
ranging from explicit repudiation to quiet apathy (Lee, 2012; 
see also Francis & Robbins, 2004).2
The relationship between youth and religion can also be 
confusing when we consider whether a religious home 
environment confers a health benefit (i.e., meaning in life, psy-
chological well-being) or whether an unaffiliated home envi-
ronment confers a health penalty. Research suggests that the 
home environment can predict future religious/spiritual identi-
ties (Baker & Smith, 2009; Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Gervais & 
Najle, 2015), but the health consequences of said home envi-
ronment remain unclear. Studies comparing secular sources 
and levels of meaning, values, and purpose with religious 
sources are virtually nonexistent (Koenig, 2012), as are the 
consequences of nonreligiosity, a nonreligious upbringing, and 
atheism on mental well-being (Galen & Kloet, 2011; Hwang, 
Hammer, & Cragun, 2011; Morgan, 2013).
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The existing literature on the relationship between theo-
logical beliefs, atheism, and fatalism allows us to broadly 
suggest that fatalism entails an acceptance of what is per-
ceived as an inevitable or uncontrollable outcome, rather 
than a lack of meaning in life or a lack of purpose. However, 
fatalism is negatively related to environmental mastery, 
itself a component of psychological well-being (Greenfield, 
Vaillant, & Marks, 2009). Conceptually, a person who 
would say that there is little that can be done to change the 
circumstances of his or her life (a person low on a sense of 
mastery or internal locus of control) is arguably less likely 
to believe that life, the universe, and personal relationships 
are meaningful in any global or time-invariant sense. 
While some research shows that mastery is positively cor-
related with religious attendance and/or religiosity (Ai, 
Peterson, Rodgers, & Tice, 2005; Ellison & Burdette, 
2011; Schieman, Pudrovska, & Milkie, 2005), other 
research finds that this relationship is inconsistent 
(Greenfield et al., 2009; Speed & Fowler, 2017). Thus, 
while there is some evidence that theists and the religiously 
affiliated would be more likely to report greater mastery, 
there is no persuasive evidence that atheists, the nonreli-
gious, and those with a nonreligious upbringing are predis-
posed toward fatalism (see also Langston, 2014, who finds 
that higher external locus of control scores reflect higher 
odds of being a theist).
The present study investigates the relationship between 
an internal source of meaning, fatalism, and nihilism in a 
nationally representative American sample in a series of nine 
planned analyses. More specifically, we sought to investigate 
whether belief in god(s), religious affiliation, or religious 
upbringing were significant predictors of an internal source 
of meaning, fatalism, and nihilism.
Method
Participants
We accessed data from the 2008 General Social Survey 
(GSS), which was collected by the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago 
(Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2013). These data are freely 
accessible from NORC’s website, which also provides a 
copy of the questionnaire and the user manual. Because this 
was secondary data analysis, we did not require the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) clearance from any institu-
tions to conduct the present study. The 2008 research year 
was chosen because it is the most recent year that contained 
all variables of interest to our research question. To be 
included in the present study, respondents had to have 
answered all covariate questions, at least one of the outcome 
variables, and at least one of the religious/spiritual (R/S) 
identifier variables. Persons answering questions with “I 
don’t know” or persons who answered by refusing to respond 
were excluded from the analyses to maintain the continuous 
nature of the data. The exact number of participants fluctu-
ated slightly from one analyses to the next, but was approxi-
mately N = 1,200 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).
Measures
Meaning in life. Endogenous Meaning, Fatalism, and Nihilism 
were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale (i.e., 1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, etc.), with higher scores indi-
cating greater levels of agreement. The 2008 GSS had an item 
we described as Endogenous Meaning (“Life is only mean-
ingful if you provide the meaning yourself”), and was con-
ceptually similar to other questions dealing with whether life 
meaning was internally constructed (e.g., Coleman, Silver, & 
Hood, 2016; Goodenough, 1998; Schnell & Keenan, 2011; 
Streib & Hood, 2013). The 2008 GSS had two items as proxy 
measures for meaning in life: Fatalism (“There is little people 
can do to change the course of their lives”) and Nihilism3 (“In 
my opinion, life does not serve any purpose”). Although the 
2008 GSS had an item that assessed God Meaning to some 
extent (“To me, life is meaningful only because God exists”), 
we did not consider using it because this question would 
make little conceptual sense with the definition of atheism 
used in the present study. Conceptually, Endogenous Mean-
ing provides information as to the perceived source of mean-
ing in life, while Nihilism and Fatalism should be inversely 
related to whether life has a personalized sense of meaning.
Religious/spiritual identifiers. We made use of three R/S Identi-
fiers as they related to meaning in life: (a) Belief Identity, (b) 
Religious Affiliation, (c) and Religious Upbringing. Belief 
Identity was based on the GSS item, “Which best describes 
your beliefs about Gods?” Response options included (a) I 
don’t believe in God now, and I never have; (b) I don’t 
believe in God now, but I used to; (c) I believe in God now, 
but I didn’t used to; and (d) I believe in God now, and I 
always have. Persons indicating that they believe in God 
now were labeled as “Theist,” and persons indicating that 
they did not believe in God now were labeled as “Atheist.” 
Belief Identity was coded, Theist = 0 and Atheist = 1. While 
the definitions provided for atheism are occasionally con-
flicting (Hwang et al., 2011), the definition used by the pres-
ent study is consistent with negative atheism (see Bullivant, 
2013), which is the most inclusive definition of nonbelief.
Religious Affiliation was based on the item, “What is 
your religious preference?” followed by a list of different 
religions. Persons who indicated “None” were labeled as 
“Religiously Unaffiliated” and persons who indicated any-
thing other than “None” were labeled as “Religiously 
Affiliated.” Religious Affiliation was coded as Religiously 
Affiliated = 0 and Religiously Unaffiliated = 1.
Religious Upbringing was based on the question, “In what 
religion were you raised?” followed by a list of different reli-
gions. Persons who indicated “None” were labeled Raised 
Religiously Unaffiliated, and persons who indicated anything 
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other than “None” were labeled Raised Religiously Affiliated. 
Religious Upbringing was coded as Raised Religiously 
Affiliated = 0 and Raised Religiously Unaffiliated = 1.
Covariates. The present study controlled for sex (male/
female), age, race (White, Black, Other; White served as 
the omitted category), marital status (married, widowed, 
divorced, separated, never married; married served as the 
omitted category), education (less than high school, high 
school, some postsecondary, postsecondary, graduate 
degree; less than high school served as the omitted cate-
gory), and income in constant dollars (e.g., 1 = US$10,000; 
2 = US$20,000, etc.). Please note that “sex” was used in 
lieu of “gender” as the GSS had asked a dichotomous male/
female question.
Procedure
All data analysis was done with Stata 13. The 2008 GSS used 
a complex sampling methodology to achieve a representative 
sample. Because of this, data were weighted to correspond to 
which strata respondents were in, the primary sampling unit, 
and a weighting correction for nonresponse rate. To achieve 
this weighting, Stata’s survey analysis module was used to 
specify the weighting parameters by using the syntax pro-
vided by Smith and colleagues (2013). In situations where a 
stratum only had a single respondent, we used a scaled 
approach to address issues with determining variance.
Hierarchical linear regression was used in all analyses. 
Because we used Stata’s survey analysis module, denomina-
tor degrees of freedom in all regression models were based 
on the number of strata rather than the number of respon-
dents. To meet the underlying assumption of homogeneity of 
variance, heteroscedastic consistent errors (HC1) were 
employed. Multicollinearity was not an issue, as the mean 
variance inflation factor did not exceed 1.13 for any model.
Nine hierarchical linear regression models were used to 
assess all three R/S Identifiers (belief, affiliation, upbring-
ing) and three outcome variables (fatalism, nihilism, endog-
enous meaning). Each model followed the same pattern.
Block 1: R/S Identifiers were added (Belief Identity, 
Religious Affiliation, and Religious Upbringing).
Block 2: Covariates were added.
Table 1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics by Religious/Spiritual Identifiers.
M (SD) or percentages within categories
 Belief identity Religious affiliation Religious upbringing
 Theist Atheist Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated
N = 1,034 115 986 192 1,078 96
Fatalism 1.95/1.01 1.91/1.09 1.97/1.03 1.83/0.92 1.94/1.01 1.94/1.03
Nihilism 1.53/0.73 1.67/0.76 1.53/0.72 1.67/0.79 1.55/0.74 1.61/0.66
Endo. Mean 3.08/1.29 3.95/1.04 3.08/1.30 3.64/1.13 3.16/1.30 3.30/1.24
Age 45.98/16.33 40.01/15.37 46.49/16.39 39.2/14.24 45.73/16.32 40.78/15.05
Income 5.57/4.47 6.94/5.59 5.59/4.51 6.36/5.15 5.71/4.6 5.76/4.93
Sex
 Female 54.37% 24.34% 54.25% 33.60% 51.62% 42.69%
 Male 45.63% 75.66% 45.75% 66.40% 48.38% 57.31%
Race
 White 75.97% 82.74% 76.36% 78.15% 75.99% 85.73%
 Black 14.85% 4.95% 13.92% 11.06% 14.29% 4.88%
 Other 9.17% 12.31% 9.72% 10.79% 9.72% 9.38%
Education
 <High School 15.58% 6.81% 15.11% 12.66% 14.95% 12.38%
 High School 49.33% 45.93% 48.05% 52.43% 48.68% 49.53%
 Junior College 9.88% 1.23% 10.09% 4.11% 8.81% 10.89%
 Bachelor 16.90% 29.24% 17.87% 19.11% 17.79% 22.76%
 Graduate 8.31% 16.78% 8.89% 11.68% 9.78% 4.43%
Marital status
 Married 56.54% 43.64% 56.41% 46.41% 55.83% 45.11%
 Widowed 5.58% 1.70% 5.71% 1.84% 5.36% 1.38%
 Divorced 11.12% 8.30% 11.18% 9.89% 11.00% 11.77%
 Separated 3.36% 0.70% 3.41% 0.93% 3.14% 1.75%
 Never Married 23.39% 45.65% 23.28% 40.93% 24.68% 39.98%
Note. Only persons who answered all questions of interest are included in this table. Endo. Mean = Endogenous Meaning.
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The inclusion of demographic covariates in Block 2, as 
opposed to Block 1, was done to avoid issues with suppres-
sion effects. It is possible that by entering covariates in Block 
1 and variables of interest in Block 2, variables of interest 
may register as significant only because covariates acted as 
suppressor variables. This potential issue is often overlooked, 
likely because there has been a historical interest in ΔR2 val-
ues. However, we were interested in whether specific R/S 
Identifiers predicted meaning in life, which could be deter-
mined by a simple investigation of the relevant coefficients 
(i.e., ΔR2 were not germane to the overall purpose of the 
study). Placing R/S Identifiers in Block 1 as opposed to 
Block 2 does not change outcomes or analysis, but rather was 
done to avoid a potential problem, at no cost to the overall 
integrity of the study.
Using G*Power (v3.1.9.2), we estimated that there was suf-
ficient power to detect small-to-medium differences (d = .28) 
between Theists/Atheists (Power = .82); sufficient power to 
detect small-to-medium differences (d = .23) between Affiliated/
Unaffiliated (Power = .83); and sufficient power to detect small-
to-medium differences (d = .30) between Raised Affiliated/
Raised Unaffiliated (Power = .80). Because it was possible for 
each regression model to miss small differences (d = .20), the 
effect sizes associated with R/S Identifiers were still discussed 
regardless of whether R/S Identifiers were statistically signifi-
cant. To make this discussion of effect sizes transparent, all 
outcome variables were standardized (West, Aiken, & Krull, 
1996). By standardizing the outcome variables, R/S Identifier 
coefficients could be interpreted in terms of how many standard 
deviation units groups differed by (e.g., Table 2, Block 1 for 
Endogenous Meaning, Belief ID = .64; Atheists were higher 
than Theists by an average of .64 SD units). A consequence of 
this standardization was that the coefficients became close 
approximations (within 2% in Block 1) of Hedges’ g effect size 
index (.20 = small, .50 = medium, .80 = large). The discussion 
of effect size is critical when using large databases because sta-
tistical significance is a product of power—with sufficient 
power any difference will become statistically significant. 
Consequently, if a coefficient was below a “small” effect size 
(i.e., B < .20), then researchers noted that the differences may be 
statistically different but not practically significant.
Results
Belief Identity: Theists Versus Atheists
The first set of analyses are displayed in Table 2. Endogenous 
Meaning was regressed onto Belief Identity in Block 1 
(n = 1,156), R2 = .038, F(1, 110) = 39.61, p < .001, and Belief 
Identity was a significant positive predictor, t = 6.29, p < .001, 
B = .83, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.57, 1.09]. Persons 
who were Atheists were more likely to indicate higher levels 









 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
Constant −.07/.05 .25/.22 .01/.04 .51/.24* −.02/.05 .87/.25**
Belief ID .64/.10*** .57/.10*** −.07/.15 .11/.14 .17/.11 .19/.12
Sex (M/F) −.05/.08 .00/.07 −.15/.06*
Age −.00/.00 .00/.00 −.00/.00
Race (White)
 Black −.08/.10 .28/.10** −.04/.10
 Other .22/.12 .18/.11 .42/.17*
Married
 Widowed .16/.15 −.10/.15 −.01/.11
 Divorced −.10/.13 −.22/.11 −.13/.09
 Separated .22/.22 −.03/.23 .09/.16
 Never Married .20/.10* −.14/.10 .08/.09
<High school
 High School −.23/.12 −.43/.13** −.57/.12***
 Junior College −.32/.15* −.61/.16*** −.54/.13***
 Bachelor −.31/.13* −.66/.14*** −.57/.12***
 Graduate −.18/.18 −.74/.18*** −.68/.14***
Income .01/.01 −.03/.01*** −.03/.01***
R2 .04*** .07* .00 .11*** .00 .11***
Note. Belief Identity: 0 = Theist; 1 = Atheist; ID = Identity.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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of Endogenous Meaning than persons who were Theists. 
Covariates were added in Block 2, ΔR2 = .036, R2 = .074, 
F(13, 110) = 2.25, p = .012, but even with their inclusion, 
being an Atheist was associated with significantly higher lev-
els of the Endogenous Meaning, t = 5.56, p < .001, B = .56, 
95% CI [0.37, 0.77] (see Figure 1).
Fatalism was regressed onto Belief Identity in Block 1 
(n = 1,165), R2 = .001, F(1, 111) = 0.21, p = .650, but the model 
did not significantly improve. When covariates were added in 
Block 2, ΔR2 = .105, R2 = .106, F(13, 111) = 7.18, p < .001, the 
model significantly improved. However, Belief Identity 
remained a nonsignificant predictor in the overall model.
Nihilism was regressed onto Belief Identity in Block 1 
(n = 1,161), R2 = .003, F(1, 111) = 2.25, p = .137, but the 
model did not substantially improve. Covariates were added 
in Block 2, ΔR2 = .109, R2 = .112, F(13, 111) = 4.60, p < .001; 
while the model improved, Belief Identity remained a non-
significant predictor of Nihilism. Although the coefficient 
for Belief Identity was not statistically significant, given the 
coefficient for Nihilism (B = .19) was close to the cut-off 
point of B = .20 for practical significance, researchers con-
ducted an additional analysis to determine there was a genu-
ine relationship between atheism and nihilism.
Noting that Atheists scored significantly higher on the 
Endogenous Meaning measure than Theists, and that 
Endogenous Meaning itself was positively correlated with 
Nihilism scores (unweighted r = .21, p < .001), researchers 
explored the relationship between Nihilism and Belief 
Identity while controlling for Endogenous Meaning. The 
analyses revealed that once Endogenous Meaning was con-
trolled for, the relationship that Belief Identity had with 
Nihilism dropped sharply (cf. B = .19, B = .10). These results 
suggest that Atheists are not more likely to score differently 
than Theists in terms of Nihilism, especially once Endogenous 
Meaning is controlled for.
Religious Affiliation: Religiously Affiliated Versus 
Religiously Unaffiliated
The second set of analyses is displayed in Table 3. Endogenous 
Meaning was regressed onto Religious Affiliation in Block 1 
(n = 1,185), R2 = .023, F(1, 111) = 16.47, p < .001, and was a 
significant positive predictor, t = 4.06, p < .001, B = .41, 
95% CI [0.21, 0.61]. Covariates were entered in Block 2, 
ΔR2 = .035, R2 = .058, F(13, 111) = 2.06, p = .024, and with 
their inclusion, Religious Affiliation continued to be a signifi-
cant predictor, t = 3.10, p = .002, B = .34, 95% CI [0.12, 0.55]. 
Ultimately, Religious Affiliation continued to positively pre-
dict Endogenous Meaning with the inclusion of covariates 
(see Table 3 and Figure 2).
Fatalism was regressed onto Religious Affiliation (n = 1,196) 
in Block 1, R2 = .003, F(1, 112) = 2.15, p = .145, but being 
Religiously Unaffiliated was not associated with Fatalism. 
Researchers added covariates in Block 2, ΔR2 = .103, R2 = .106, 
F(13, 112) = 7.33, p < .001, but even with these inclusions, 
Religious Affiliation was again not associated Fatalism.
The relationship between Nihilism and Religious 
Affiliation (n = 1,191) was investigated next. Nihilism was 
regressed onto Religious Affiliation in Block 1 of the regres-
sion model, R2 = .004, F(1, 112) = 2.81, p = .097, but Religious 
Affiliation was a nonsignificant predictor of Nihilism. 
Covariates were added in Block 2, ΔR2 = .103, R2 = .107, 
F(13, 112) = 4.70 p < .001; however, Religious Affiliation did 
not predict Nihilism.
Subgroup analyses. In a series of unplanned post hoc tests, we 
expanded on the analyses pertaining to Religious Affiliation 
and investigated whether specific religious categories were 
associated with differences in meaning in life. Unfortunately, 
while the 2008 GSS provided information on religious affili-
ation, most of the category options were underpopulated. 
Figure 1. Theists and atheists for endogenous meaning (with standard error bars).
Note. t = 5.71, p < .001, unstandardized Mdiff = 0.74, approximate Hedge’s g = 0.57.
Speed et al. 7
Consequently, only four categories could be compared (Reli-
giously Unaffiliated, n = 177; Protestant, n = 601; Catholic, 
n = 285; and Other, n = 97).
We examined whether moving from the Religiously 
Unaffiliated group to the Protestant group, Catholic group, or 
Other group was associated with differences or changes in 
Fatalism, Nihilism, or Endogenous Meaning. Because the 
comparisons were unplanned, we used Holm–Bonferroni 
corrected p values in interpreting the coefficients. Results 
showed no differences across the Fatalism or Nihilism mod-
els using these corrected values. However, moving from the 
Religiously Unaffiliated group to the Protestant group was 









 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
Constant −.07/.05 .25/.22 .02/.05 .53/.23* −.03/.05 .89/.25**
Religious Affiliation ID .41/.10*** .34/.11** −.14/.10 −.07/.10 .18/.11 .16/.10
Sex (male/female) −.09/.08 −.01/.07 −.18/.06**
Age −.00/.00 .00/.00 −.00/.00
Race (White)
 Black −.11/.10 .28/.10** −.05/.10
 Other .20/.12 .23/.10* .39/.16*
Married
 Widowed .15/.15 −.08/.15 −.01/.11
 Divorced −.10/.13 −.21/.11 −.11/.09
 Separated .24/.22 −.02/.23 .09/.16
 Never Married .22/.10* −.11/.09 .06/.08
<High school
 High School −.22/.12 −.41/.12** −.54/.11***
 Junior College −.30/.14* −.56/.15*** −.51/.13***
 Bachelor −.24/.13 −.64/.13*** −.55/.12***
 Graduate −.11/.18 −.69/.17*** −.64/.14***
Income .01/.01 −.03/.01*** −.03/.01***
R2 .02*** .06* .00 .11*** .00 .11***
Note. Religious Affiliation: 0 = Religiously Affiliated; 1 = Religiously Unaffiliated; ID = Identity.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 2. Religiously affiliated and religiously unaffiliated for endogenous meaning (with standard error bars).
Note. t = 3.27, p = .001, unstandardized Mdiff = 0.44, approximate Hedge’s g = 0.34.
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associated with a significant drop in Endogenous Meaning, 
t = −3.78, p < .001, B = −.42, 95% CI [−0.64, −0.20]. 
However, whether this was a product of something special 
about the Protestant group in relation to the Religiously 
Unaffiliated group is unclear.
Religious Upbringing: Raised Religiously Affiliated 
Versus Raised Religiously Unaffiliated
The third set of analyses is displayed in Table 4. Endogenous 
Meaning was regressed onto Religious Upbringing in 
Block 1 (n = 1,182) of the regression model, R2 = .001, 
F(1, 112) = 0.99, p = .321, but Religious Upbringing was a 
nonsignificant predictor. Covariates were added in Block 
2, ΔR2 = .044, R2 = .045, F(13, 112) = 2.84, p = .002, but 
Religious Upbringing remained a nonsignificant predictor 
of Endogenous Meaning (see Table 4).
Fatalism was regressed onto Religious Upbringing in 
Block 1 (n = 1,193) of the regression model, R2 = .001, 
F(1, 113) = 0.74, p = .391, and Religious Upbringing was a 
nonsignificant predictor of Fatalism. With the inclusion of 
covariates in Block 2, ΔR2 = .104, R2 = .105, F(13, 113) = 
7.16, p < .001, Religious Upbringing continued to be a non-
significant predictor of Fatalism.
We then investigated the relationship between Religious 
Upbringing and Nihilism (n = 1,188). Nihilism was regressed 
onto Religious Upbringing in Block 1 of a regression model, 
R2 = .001, F(1, 113) = 1.29, p = .259, but did not significantly 
improve on the prediction of Fatalism. Covariates were added 
in Block 2, ΔR2 = .104, R2 = .106, F(13, 113) = 4.69, p < .001, 
but even with their inclusion, Religious Upbringing remained 
a nonsignificant predictor of Nihilism.
Subgroup analyses. Following up on the Religious Upbring-
ing analyses, researchers investigated whether being raised 
Protestant (n = 656), Catholic (n = 376), or Other (n = 51) 
was associated with differing levels of Fatalism, Nihilism, or 
Endogenous meaning when compared with persons who 
were raised in a Religiously Unaffiliated home (n = 103). We 
used Holm–Bonferroni corrections for these comparisons 
across the three regression models. However, results showed 
no differences across the Fatalism, Nihilism, or Endogenous 
Meaning models. In other words, being raised in a Catholic, 
Protestant, or Other home was not associated with differ-
ences when compared with persons raised in a Religiously 
Unaffiliated homes.
Discussion
The present study investigated whether various aspects of 
irreligion predicted fatalism, nihilism, and the perception of 
life meaning being internally produced. While the existing 









 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
Constant −.01/.05* .37/.22 .01/.04* .50/.23 −.01/.05* .95/.24
Religious Upbringing ID .12/.12 .09/.11 −.12/.14 −.05/.12 .14/.12 .16/.11
Sex (M/F) −.12/.07 .00/.07 −.19/.06
Age .00/.00** .00/.00** .00/.00**
Race (White)
 Black −.12/.10 .27/.10 −.05/.10
 Other .20/.11 .21/.10 .39/.16
Married
 Widowed .17/.15 −.09/.15 .00/.11
 Divorced −.10/.13 −.22/.11 −.12/.09
 Separated .22/.22 −.02/.23 .08/.16
 Never Married .24/.10 −.12/.09 .07/.08
<High school
 High School −.21/.11 −.41/.13 −.54/.11
 Junior College −.32/.14 −.55/.16 −.52/.12
 Bachelor −.23/.13 −.62/.13 −.55/.12
 Graduate −.09/.18 −.70/.17 −.62/.14
Income .01/.01* −.03/.01** −.03/.01**
R2 .00 .05** .00 .10*** .00 .11***
Note. Religious Upbringing: 0 = Raised Religiously Affiliated; 1 = Raised Religiously Unaffiliated; ID = Identity.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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literature specifies inherent deficits that atheists, the reli-
giously unaffiliated, and persons raised in religiously unaf-
filiated homes are likely to face regarding meaning in life, 
our results did not produce support for such views. In fact, 
these “identity variables” were largely irrelevant to the sta-
tistical models. However, the analysis confirmed that athe-
ists and the religiously unaffiliated were more likely to 
indicate that life has endogenously produced meaning—one 
of the few persistent differences between the groups we 
examined.
Are the Irreligious More Likely to Be Fatalists and 
Nihilists?
Our present results do not support the idea that atheists or the 
religiously unaffiliated possess a greater sense of fatalism or 
nihilism. While it is possible to frame the results from the 
present study as running against the existing literature, we 
think that the case for atheist or nonreligious deficits in life 
meaning was never adequately established to begin with. 
This is because most views on this topic rest on academic 
speculation as to the relationship between atheism, religion, 
and meaning in life, rather than empirical tests. Our findings 
suggest that atheists/theists and the religiously unaffiliated/
affiliated do not systematically differ with regard to fatalism 
and nihilism, constructs that are routinely linked with psy-
chological well-being. Overall, these findings would be con-
sistent with at least a few other studies that find that atheists 
or the religiously unaffiliated do not suffer from psychologi-
cal deficits because of their position (Galen & Kloet, 2011; 
Speed, 2017).
Are Assumptions Underpinning Meaning in Life 
Warranted?
In light of our findings, it is instructive to investigate why the 
idea persists that irreligion should reflect differences on 
nihilism, fatalism, and source of meaning in life in general. 
In our view, the literature often fails to appropriately distin-
guish between types of meaning, either in its endogenous 
form (meaning perceived to be internally produced) or exog-
enous form (meaning perceived to be externally produced). 
It is important to note that exogenous meaning does not nec-
essarily imply the source is god(s). Granted, this may be a 
“traditional” source of exogenous meaning, but it should not 
be thought of as a sole source as persons may perceive any 
number of external things provide them within meaning 
(e.g., the universe, karma, membership in social groups, rela-
tionships, occupation). However, if meaning in life is 
assumed to be given or bestowed on persons from a transcen-
dent source, then this assumption has a substantial impact on 
investigating an atheistic worldview. Under such an assump-
tion, it would be technically true to suggest that atheists have 
less meaning in their lives than theists, but this is only 
because the notion that atheists do not derive meaning from 
god(s) would be tautological. Moreover, given a definition of 
meaning where a deity is inherent, what would differences 
between atheists and theists actually signify? In such a case, 
one group would, by definition, be excluded from experienc-
ing meaning.
Making one’s own purpose. A consistent and strong finding 
that emerged from the present study was related to Endoge-
nous Meaning. Being either an atheist or religiously unaffili-
ated was associated with stronger agreement that meaning in 
life came from within, and these differences persisted despite 
the inclusion of covariates. Not only were these differences 
statistically significant, but they were also of practical sig-
nificance. The observed effect size for atheists in this regard 
was g = .57 (a medium-to-large effect), and the effect size for 
the religiously unaffiliated was g = .34 (a small-to-medium 
effect). These findings are consistent with two complimen-
tary ideas: Theists and the religiously affiliated are more 
likely to believe that life has extrinsically produced meaning 
(possibly due to god or gods), and atheists and the religiously 
unaffiliated are more likely to perceive meaning as a product 
of the self rather than a product of an external source or agent 
(or a relationship with this agent).
Researchers often start with the perception or assumption 
that meaning is exogenous, or that exogenous meaning is 
richer or more fulfilling than endogenous meaning (e.g., 
Park & McNamara, 2006). This approach can, unsurpris-
ingly, lead to conclusions that atheists have impoverished 
levels of meaning in life as compared with theists. If mean-
ing in life is exogenous, then one would expect atheists and, 
to a lesser extent, the religiously unaffiliated, to report greater 
levels of fatalism and nihilism. However, despite an ade-
quately powered analysis using nationally representative 
data, these relationships did not emerge. While several rea-
sons could be provided to explain these null findings, we 
think that the simplest explanation is that meaning in life is 
multidimensional and varies across social categories. On 
average, atheists (and to a lesser extent the religiously unaf-
filiated), in theory, are less likely to accept an exogenous 
source of meaning—and were more likely to believe mean-
ing was internally produced. Again, these findings are con-
sistent with the idea that “whatever makes life meaningful is 
heavily loaded with whatever people value” (Klinger, 2012, 
p. 29). Atheists in particular are perhaps less likely to have an 
externally grounded meaning in life—but not any meaning 
in life (Jörns, 1997).
Our findings generally align with Wong (1998), who gen-
erated a personal meaning scale, by asking individuals about 
what makes life meaningful and then factor analyzing the 
responses. An overwhelming number of the items were 
related to goal pursuit; the factor of achievement striving 
explained over three times the amount of variance explained 
by the “religion” factor (see Klinger, 2012, p. 29). Religiously 
derived meaning may serve as a central source of meaning 
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only insofar as it is personally and socially valued, and such 
valuation itself may be part of socialization and learning pro-
cesses. This illustrates the issues with assuming that com-
mon beliefs or behaviors are generalizable to all. Exogenous 
meaning certainly exists for many, but that does not mean 
that endogenous meaning can or should be ignored. As King, 
Heintzelman, and Ward (2016) suggest, “the experience of 
meaning in life may be quite a bit more commonplace than is 
often portrayed” (p. 211), and we observe that religion is one 
of many paths for attaining it.
We can also point out that if exogenous meaning is defined 
as meaning that is not self-made, this definition does not 
intrinsically implicate religion or theism. In this study, we 
were specifically concerned with exogenous meaning-mak-
ing processes in the context of theism, that is, specifically 
religious meaning-making. The religiously unaffiliated, and 
even atheists, can reference or at least perceive a spiritual or 
transcendent meaning of external origin, though for atheists, 
this would very likely depend on how “spirituality” was 
framed or defined. For example, studies suggest that when 
atheists are given the opportunity to list sources of profun-
dity and meaning, they often list external sources such as 
nature, the universe, social causes, and humanity (Caldwell-
Harris et al., 2011; Coleman & Arrowood, 2015; Coleman, 
Silver, & Holcombe, 2013). Future research should explore 
the psychological consequences of utilizing these external 
sources of meaning.
Limitations, Future Directions, and Conclusion
The present study had several limitations. First, we assessed 
the perception of the extent to which life meaning is inter-
nally produced, the perception that life was without mean-
ing, and the perception that one could not act meaningfully 
with agency. In other words, “life is only meaningful if you 
provide the meaning yourself” is not equivalent to “I have a 
high level of self-produced meaning” or other measures of 
meaning in life. Ideally, we would have assessed actual lev-
els of self-produced life meaning, which would have allowed 
for more robust conclusions. However, the questions used in 
the present study demonstrate some conceptual overlap with 
aspects of the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (cf. Steger & 
Frazier, 2005) for nihilism (“In my opinion, life does not 
serve any purpose”; cf. “My life has no clear purpose”; 
Steger & Frazier, 2005). Generally, our point yet remains 
that, to avoid classification and measurement issues with 
nonreligious individuals and populations, future research 
should always seek to discriminate between meaning-mak-
ing processes that rely on external versus internal sources. To 
the extent that such distinctions are obscured or not accounted 
for, this may produce misleading conclusions about the 
impact of meaning in life on other important psychological 
outcomes.
Second, given that archival data were used, the present 
study was limited to whichever items were asked. However, 
the 2008 GSS was specifically chosen because it contained 
relevant questions that allowed us to adequately test hypoth-
eses related to meaning, religion, purpose, and fatalism. A 
related limitation was the number of atheists (n = 115), reli-
giously unaffiliated (n = 192), and raised religiously unaffili-
ated (n = 96) available in the dataset. While these numbers 
allowed for adequately powered analyses, it would be bene-
ficial to have a greater number of these groups represented in 
future research. Although the GSS is a nationally representa-
tive sample, the final sample size was more characteristic of 
psychological studies than of sociological studies at the 
macro level. An overall larger sample size would also be 
desirable to attain more precise population parameter esti-
mates, allowing us increased confidence in the presence (or 
absence!) of differences between groups.
It should be noted that focusing on the self as a source of 
meaning bears a specific relation to the kind of culture found 
in the United States, which is a notably individualistic one. 
In this way, we caution that our findings may only be plau-
sible in the context of postindustrial, Westernized countries. 
This raises the question of whether the self would be a salient 
source of meaning for nonreligious or atheistic individuals 
elsewhere in the world. There is good reason to think that the 
self would be less prominent an element of meaning-making 
in other cultures and countries. As such, a cross-cultural per-
spective on our topic would be a valuable contribution to the 
study of meaning systems, identity, and the production of 
meaning in life.
Future research should also seek to delineate between 
types of religious affiliation and religious upbringing to 
determine whether meaning in life is predicted by this speci-
ficity. Unfortunately, while the GSS contained a more spe-
cific breakdown of religious affiliations, many of the 
categories were too small to allow for adequately-powered 
analyses. Nevertheless, it is possible that a more refined 
analysis of these groups, using a different dataset, would 
allow for a better picture of differences to emerge.
Overall, the present study found no support for the con-
tention that atheists and the religiously unaffiliated were 
more prone to nihilism or fatalism than their respective coun-
terparts. While these groups were more likely to indicate that 
meaning in life was endogenous, these differences did not 
seem to coincide with a view that life was uncontrollable or 
without meaning. Religious affiliation and/or belief in god(s) 
is certainly a pathway toward meaning in life; however, no 
potential source for meaning is also a necessary source for 
meaning.
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Notes
1. Other scientists have disagreed (e.g., Goodenough, 1998); “It 
does no harm to the romance of the sunset to know a little bit 
about it” (Sagan, 1994, p. 80).
2. For extensive reviews of the demographic and personality 
characteristics of the nonreligious and atheists, see Caldwell-
Harris (2012), Galen (2014), Streib and Klein (2013), and 
Zuckerman (2009).
3. Nihilism is not necessarily equivalent to absence of purpose, in 
the sense that it can be a broader reference to moral or ontolog-
ical nihilism. Worded as it is, however, the item from the GSS 
reflects more specifically the concept of “purposelessness.”
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